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The economic downturn’s severity varied across the 12 communities, with 2009 
unemployment rates ranging from 6.2 per-
cent in Little Rock, Ark., to 11.1 percent in 
Greenville, S.C., compared with an average 
of 9.2 percent across metropolitan areas. 
Overall, large hospitals and hospital systems 
in the 12 communities weathered the reces-
sion fairly well, maintaining strong bottom 
lines, even in markets such as Cleveland 
and Miami, where the recession’s impact 
was particularly severe (see Data Source). 
Most hospitals did see revenues decline 
and uncompensated care costs increase as 
privately insured patients struggled to pay 
out-of-pocket costs, shifted to Medicaid and 
other coverage for lower-income people, or 
lost coverage altogether. Reduced patient 
demand, particularly for elective procedures, 
decreased operating revenues, although hos-
pitals noted that volumes already were stabi-
lizing as local economies began to recover. 
Most hospitals avoided operating losses 
during the downturn, however, in part by 
reducing staff, adjusting salaries and ben-
efits, and improving productivity. Some 
hospitals postponed, scaled back or even 
canceled construction projects. “Must-
have” hospitals—large hospital systems and 
individual hospitals that health plans must 
include in their provider networks to remain 
attractive to consumers—typically main-
tained or increased negotiating leverage over 
private insurers. For these hospitals, com-
mercial payment rates continued to increase 
faster than unit costs, offsetting losses on 
Medicaid patients and sometimes Medicare 
patients. Some independent hospitals and 
smaller systems—particularly those serv-
ing more low-income patients—without the 
clout to obtain higher payment rates from 
private insurers did not fare as well.
In contrast to hospitals with significant 
market power, many physician practices 
remained price-takers in negotiations with 
health insurers, with little, if any, increases 
in payment rates. However, in several mar-
kets, some practices could command size-
able rate increases, including large, hospi-
tal-owned or exclusively affiliated practices 
in Greenville and Boston and large special-
ty practices in Miami. For most physicians, 
practice expenses continued to grow as fast 
as or faster than commercial payment rates, 
providing little cushion against relatively 
flat Medicare reimbursement rates. Some 
physicians continued to protect earnings 
by increasing volume of services, especially 
in-office ancillary services, and trimming 
practice expenses. At the same time, physi-
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cians faced growing pressure to invest in 
costly electronic health records (EHRs), 
particularly with the introduction of federal 
EHR incentive programs. 
Hospital expansion strategies
Hospitals continued to compete aggressive-
ly for patients and increase market share. 
Notably, strategies to expand geographic 
market areas, while not new, have become 
more widespread across most of the 12 
communities since 2007. Generally, the 
hospital geographic expansion race involves 
pursuing well-insured patients beyond 
traditional market boundaries, whether in 
affluent suburbs or nearby urban and rural 
growth areas. To expand, hospital systems 
were building new capacity or acquiring or 
affiliating with existing providers in these 
areas to attract both physicians and patients 
to shore up referral bases and capture 
admissions, respectively.
In some areas, such as Greenville, 
hospital systems have opened full-service 
hospitals. In others, hospital systems have 
opened outpatient centers or freestanding 
emergency departments (EDs) that can be 
used in a “hub-and-spoke” model to direct 
referrals for more complex specialty and 
inpatient care to existing flagship hospitals. 
For example, in Cleveland, Indianapolis 
and Miami, hospital systems have built 
networks of outpatient centers that include 
offices for employed or closely aligned phy-
sicians, laboratory services, imaging equip-
ment and sometimes urgent care clinics. 
A relatively new phenomenon, free-
standing EDs provide many of the same 
services as hospital-based EDs and the 
same opportunities for increased revenue 
in locations with well-insured populations. 
Freestanding EDs typically transfer patients 
needing advanced care to a system’s nearest 
hospital, perhaps bypassing closer hospi-
tals if the patient is medically stable. For 
example, Swedish Medical Center, Seattle’s 
largest hospital system, was planning a 
string of freestanding EDs in high-growth 
areas outside the city. At the same time, 
nearby smaller community hospitals were 
pursuing similar strategies to protect their 
market share. 
While geographic competition has 
accelerated recently in such communities 
as Miami and Seattle, it has been underway 
longer in other communities, including 
Cleveland and Indianapolis. In those mar-
kets, the health care sector is becoming 
increasingly consolidated over widening 
regions, as independent hospitals and phy-
sicians join these expanding systems.
Hospital-Physician Alignment
The acceleration of geographic expansion 
strategies complements longstanding hos-
pital efforts to expand profitable specialty-
service lines and stepped-up efforts to align 
more closely with physicians, with physi-
cian employment, in particular, increasing 
significantly. During the 2007 site visits, 
hospitals were employing specialists as part 
of broader service-line strategies or to fill 
gaps in emergency on-call coverage. In a few 
markets, including Cleveland, Greenville 
and Indianapolis, hospitals also employed—
or were aligned closely with—large numbers 
of primary care physicians (PCPs). 
Since 2007, in many communities, the 
trend of hospitals employing physicians 
has accelerated and broadened to include 
PCPs, as well as a wider range of special-
ists. Hospitals see physician employment 
and tighter alignment not only as a way to 
capture more specialty and hospital refer-
rals in a fee-for-service payment system, 
but also as central to building the clinical 
and financial integration needed to succeed 
under potential new payment models, such 
as accountable care organizations (ACOs), 
that involve risk-sharing and reward quality 
and efficiency. 
Physicians in most markets—faced with 
financial pressures, difficulties recruit-
ing younger physicians who often prefer 
employment in larger organizations, and 
growing uncertainty about the future under 
health reform—were more actively seeking 
the stability and security of employment in 
larger physician-owned or hospital-owned 
groups. While strained relations between 
hospitals and physicians in some markets 
have not dissipated, many hospitals report-
ed that physicians were more frequently 
initiating discussions about employ-
ment. Some markets, such as Cleveland, 
Indianapolis and Greenville, appeared to be 
nearing saturation in hospital employment 
of PCPs and specialists, while in other 
markets, such as northern New Jersey and 
Miami, hospital and physician interest in 
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employment lagged. In still other markets, 
competition between hospitals to employ 
physicians was heating up.
Hospitals were using an array of strategies 
to gain the loyalty of physicians choosing to 
remain independent, including providing 
physicians with administrative and health 
plan contracting support and offering finan-
cial and administrative support for EHR 
implementation. In a turnabout from earlier 
site visits and in response to declining profit-
ability, specialty practices that had invested 
in ambulatory surgery centers and imaging 
centers in direct competition with hospitals 
have been selling these facilities to hospitals 
or entering joint ventures.  
Premium Hikes Attract scrutiny
Health plans’ inability to stem provider pay-
ment rate increases was most pronounced 
in markets like Miami, where a highly frag-
mented health plan sector—with each plan 
holding relatively modest market share—
lacks clout against increasingly consolidated 
hospitals and single-specialty physician 
groups. Rate increases also proved hard to 
contain in Boston, where a different dynam-
ic was at play: Even more than consolida-
tion, it is prestige and brand-name appeal 
that have conferred must-have status and 
the consequent ability to raise payment rates 
on select academic medical centers. While 
the pattern of high and increasing provider 
leverage was evident in many markets, it 
didn’t hold true in all communities. Highly 
dominant plans in some markets—such as 
Blue plans in Lansing and Syracuse—contin-
ued to keep provider rate increases relatively 
in check—even when dealing, as in Lansing, 
with a highly consolidated hospital sector. 
Large provider rate increases generally 
were passed on to employers in the form 
of premium increases—adding to the acute 
cost pressures of the economic downturn on 
employers. Steep premium hikes attracted 
scrutiny from many state regulators and 
other policy makers. Massachusetts and New 
York were among the states that imposed 
rate review on plans in the individual and 
small-group markets in 2010. 
Views were mixed on the impact of rate 
review, with some observers concerned that 
it might lead some plans to exit a market 
segment already lacking in plan competition 
in some communities. In addition, many 
observers suggested that to make a meaning-
ful impact on costs, regulators would need 
to focus on underlying provider payment 
rates—not just insurer premiums. However, 
many questioned whether sufficient politi-
cal will could be mustered to curb rates 
for high-cost hospital systems, given the 
prominent standing of these institutions 
in their communities and the potential 
impact of payment cuts on employment. Not 
only is the hospital sector among the larg-
est employers in many markets, but it was 
among the very few sectors that grew during 
the recession. 
Consumer-driven Health Plans 
grow, But Consumerism Lags
In discussing trends in consumerism, it is 
important to distinguish the broad con-
cept—consumers having sizable financial 
incentives, information on prices, quality 
and treatment alternatives, and taking more 
responsibility for their own health—from 
a specific approach to benefit design—
consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) 
requiring large deductibles and often paired 
with a tax-advantaged savings account. The 
past few years have seen significant CDHP 
growth in most markets—often starting 
from a negligible base and increasing to a 
modest share of enrollment overall, but a 
significant portion of small-group enroll-
ment. For example, in Boston—a market 
with historically rich benefits—CDHPs had 
grown to 15 percent of commercial enroll-
ment and half of small-group enrollment 
by 2010. CDHP growth has been boosted 
primarily by cost pressures on employers—
pressures intensified by the recession, but 
also resulting from longer-term utilization 
and provider rate trends that health plans 
have had difficulty containing. 
While CDHPs gained some traction in 
many markets, the broader consumerism 
movement did not keep pace. There was 
limited growth in the tools designed to 
inform and empower consumers, such as 
Web sites reporting hospital and physician 
price and quality information. More health 
plans, along with other private and public 
entities, have introduced or expanded such 
transparency initiatives over the last few 
years, but the number of programs provid-
ing actionable, provider-specific price and 
quality information remained quite limited. 
Community tracking study  
site Visit researchers
HSC conducted its 2010 site visits in col-
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researchers are organized into three 
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And, even when useful consumer-support 
tools were available in a handful of markets, 
evidence to date suggested that public aware-
ness and use of these tools were limited. 
Plan executives, brokers and benefits 
consultants in many markets observed that 
employers adopting CDHPs as the only ben-
efit option were often focused primarily or 
solely on premium savings rather than pro-
moting consumer engagement. Indeed, an 
increasingly common practice in some mar-
kets among employers seeking to keep pre-
miums down, while also shielding employees 
from high out-of-pocket exposure, was to 
pair CDHPs with wraparound arrangements 
that reimburse employees for expenses 
incurred within the deductible portion of 
coverage. Health plans were struggling with 
this employer practice, arguing that it runs 
counter to the intent of CDHPs and noting 
that CDHP premiums were priced under the 
assumption that enrollees would be exposed 
to the full deductible. Plans in several mar-
kets recently began pushing back by imple-
menting tiered CDHP pricing, making the 
lowest-priced products ineligible for wrap-
around coverage.
Many small employers adopting CDHPs 
purely for the premium savings were in no 
financial position to provide either wrap-
around coverage or to contribute to health 
savings accounts or health reimbursement 
arrangements. Since the start of the reces-
sion, small employers increasingly turned to 
CDHPs as an alternative to dropping cover-
age altogether. Employees with such cover-
age “are exposed to the ‘skin in the game’ 
part of consumerism, perhaps over-exposed 
[beyond] their ability to pay…but the broad-
er notion of having them take on responsi-
bility for [treatment decisions] or [provider] 
and lifestyle choices—that hasn’t been part of 
the equation,” observed one California bro-
ker, echoing the views of market observers 
throughout the 12 communities.
When CDHPs were offered by large 
employers, they still tended to be offered 
as a choice rather than as a total replace-
ment of existing benefit options. Many large 
companies adopting CDHPs were taking a 
somewhat cautious approach of introduc-
ing a CDHP alongside existing traditional 
product options and encouraging employees 
to choose the CDHP by offering substantial 
savings account contributions, sometimes 
combined with higher employer premium 
contributions. Once CDHP enrollment 
reached a significant level (such as 20% to 
25%) after a few years, an employer might 
switch to the CDHP as the main option, 
requiring employees to “buy up” for tradi-
tional products.
One prominent exception to the pat-
tern of large employers transitioning cau-
tiously to CDHPs was Indianapolis, where 
pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly joined early 
CDHP adopter Marsh Supermarkets in 
implementing total replacement. In addition, 
the state of Indiana—while prohibited by 
state law from offering only high-deductible 
plans—adopted such strong premium incen-
tives in favor of CDHPs that 85 percent of 
state employees were enrolled in these plans 
rather than traditional preferred provider 
organization (PPO) and health maintenance 
organization (HMO) options. This stood 
in marked contrast to most other markets, 
where public employers were not offering or 
even contemplating high-deductible plans 
as options. While less prevalent than in 
Indianapolis, CDHPs also had taken hold in 
Greenville, where high-profile employers like 
Michelin were moving toward total replace-
ment.
Along with CDHP adoption, employers 
continued to increase patient cost sharing 
in traditional insurance products. In 2007, 
many market observers had suggested that 
patient cost sharing had reached its limit and 
that employers would have to find alterna-
tives to moderate premium costs. With the 
recession, however, those views changed, 
and employers continued to pass more costs 
along to employees. One result was a blur-
ring of distinctions between CDHPs and 
conventional PPOs, as average individual-
coverage deductibles for the latter climbed to 
$1,000 in some markets. In markets with a 
historically strong HMO presence, employ-
ers continued to migrate from HMOs with 
traditional first-dollar coverage to HMOs 
with deductibles. In Orange County, for 
example, an estimated 80 percent of Kaiser 
Permanente’s employer accounts reportedly 
offered an HMO with a deductible, either 
as the sole benefit offering or as part of a 
“high-low” strategy requiring the employee 
to pay the premium differential for first-
dollar coverage. 
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Wellness expands
Generally, there was little innovation in 
health plan products across the 12 com-
munities, but products featuring prevention 
and wellness components have proliferated 
since 2007, spreading well beyond products 
demanded by large, self-insured employers 
to target even small-group segments. Nearly 
all commercial products included a few basic 
wellness features built into the premium: 
online health risk assessments (question-
naires completed by employees or depen-
dents about their own health and lifestyle), 
online action plans (suggestions for treat-
ment or other interventions, typically based 
on responses to health risk assessments), and 
access to online resources, such as WebMD. 
Beyond these basic features, plans in 
most markets offered fully insured products 
rewarding enrollees for completing health 
risk assessments and participating in lifestyle 
management programs. To a much lesser 
extent, plans in some markets had begun 
offering fully insured products rewarding 
enrollees for achieving health benchmarks 
on measures such as body mass index, blood 
pressure and cholesterol levels. While inter-
est in wellness as a cost-containment strat-
egy had spread well beyond large employers, 
actual adoption of wellness products by 
small and mid-sized employers remained 
modest, in large part because these products 
carry higher price tags—a particular chal-
lenge during the economic downturn.
Among large, self-insured employ-
ers—many that first implemented wellness 
strategies years ago—there was an ongoing 
push to increase integration between well-
ness and disease management to create 
comprehensive care management approaches 
capable of dealing with the continuum of 
healthy to unhealthy behaviors. Despite the 
somewhat dampening effect of the recession, 
an increasing number of large private- and 
public-sector employers were taking a more 
direct role in care delivery by launching 
workplace health clinics, many of which 
provide primary care in addition to conven-
tional wellness services. As one benefits con-
sultant observed, “Wellness is…the last tool 
that’s left in the toolkit to control costs and 
manage care…so many [large] employers 
are really investing in it, pursuing it aggres-
sively.” Whether wellness programs will yield 
positive returns on investment, however, 
remains to be seen. 
trading Benefits, Broad 
networks for Lower Premiums
In contrast to wellness, which requires 
employers to invest up front in expectation 
of future payoffs, other product innovations 
introduced or retooled by plans in recent 
years typically featured limited benefits or 
limited provider networks in exchange for 
lower premiums. Limited-benefit prod-
ucts, often marketed as “value plans,” were 
targeted primarily at cost-conscious small 
employers and individuals. Reduced benefits 
were marketed in many different forms, 
including limits on the number of covered 
office visits, caps on prescription drug cover-
age (e.g., at $500), or copayments for office 
visits but high coinsurance (e.g., 50%) for all 
other services. 
When limited-network benefit designs 
first attracted attention in the past decade, 
it was largely the result of large employers 
demanding these options from health plans 
as part of a value-based purchasing strategy. 
Narrow-network products exclude non-
preferred providers from the network, while 
tiered-network products place these provid-
ers in a tier requiring higher patient cost 
sharing at the point of service. To date, how-
ever, these products have yet to gain traction 
in the large-group segment, in part because 
of strong provider pushback—including 
litigation—and regulatory scrutiny regard-
ing how health plans designate providers for 
inclusion in high-performance networks. In 
addition, many large employers have found 
the premium differential between narrow-
network and full-network products—typi-
cally 10 percent—too small to justify giving 
up broad provider choice. 
Instead, it was in the individual and 
small-group markets where narrow-network 
and tiered-network products made headway 
in some markets. While nearly all such prod-
ucts focus on limiting physician networks, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
took a different approach, offering products 
with hospital tiering in Boston—a reflec-
tion of the impact of high and fast-growing 
hospital payment rates on already high pre-
miums in this community. First introduced 
or revamped in 2010, these products impose 
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large out-of-pocket penalties for using lower-
tier (higher-cost) hospitals, including the 
renowned flagships of Partners HealthCare 
System and Children’s Hospital. According 
to media accounts, about one-third of indi-
vidual and small-group accounts renewing 
in early 2011 switched to one of these tiered-
hospital products.
safety net Caught more People
The economic recession led to more people 
needing low- or no-cost health care at the 
same time the downturn reduced states’ and 
communities’ financial ability to support 
these services. While demand for safety net 
services had been growing for a number of 
years as the rising cost of health insurance 
resulted in slimmer benefits or loss of cover-
age, safety net providers saw demand jump 
during the recession as even more people 
became uninsured or covered by Medicaid. 
Many of these people were “newly poor” 
patients who had not used the safety net 
before. The extent of need varied across 
communities: in 2009, the percentage of 
the population that was uninsured or had 
Medicaid coverage ranged from approxi-
mately 22 percent in Boston to 48 percent 
in Miami. Although challenged, safety net 
providers generally absorbed much of the 
increased demand and remained financially 
stable, often with the help of federal policy 
that protected Medicaid eligibility and 
increased direct funding to providers.
Changes in patient volume varied across 
communities and type of provider. Overall, 
volume increased most dramatically for pri-
mary care providers, including community 
health centers and free clinics. Safety net 
hospitals’ emergency department volume 
typically increased while inpatient admis-
sions often were stable or dropped, possibly 
because of people postponing elective proce-
dures. However, several safety net providers 
in Cleveland and Phoenix saw more stable 
or even declining volumes overall for certain 
services, which they attributed, respectively, 
to general population declines and an exodus 
of undocumented immigrants because of 
job losses and heightened fears of deporta-
tion. Health centers in Miami also typically 
saw stable or waning demand, which some 
respondents believed reflected the reduced 
ability of patients to pay income-related fees.
stimulus dollars                 
stretch the safety net 
In many cases, community health cen-
ters were able to treat additional patients 
because of an influx of funds from the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA). These federal stimulus dollars 
helped health centers in five of the 12 com-
munities become federally qualified health 
centers (FQHCs), a designation that brings 
enhanced Medicaid reimbursement and 
direct grants to support the costs of caring 
for the uninsured. For example, the Ingham 
County Health Department—the Lansing 
area’s safety net hub—achieved federal status 
for some of its clinics, and in Orange County, 
which previously had a sole FQHC organi-
zation for a community of approximately 
750,000 low-income people, several more 
were established. 
All existing FQHCs throughout the coun-
try received temporary grants to help meet 
the increased demand for services, and many 
received grants to add facilities and for capital 
projects. These grants allowed health centers 
to expand in several common ways, including 
increasing or renovating physical space, hiring 
staff, and purchasing new equipment—often 
information technology to develop EHRs. 
While these expansions often focused on 
primary care, some FQHCs—for example, 
in northern New Jersey and Indianapolis—
expanded dental and behavioral health capac-
ity. Total ARRA funding for FQHCs varied 
across the 12 communities, largely correlated 
with their number of health centers: from just 
over $1 million for the one FQHC in Little 
Rock to approximately $80 million across the 
31 FQHCs in Boston.  
In contrast, non-FQHC clinics and 
safety net hospitals did not directly benefit 
from stimulus funding. Ineligible for ARRA 
grants, free clinics instead were reliant on 
continued support from volunteers, grants 
and philanthropy—giving increased for some 
clinics and declined for others. Although 
ARRA increased disproportionate share 
hospital (DSH) payments to states for fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010—the funds are intended 
to support hospitals serving a high percent-
age of low-income patients—safety net hos-
pitals reported that additional DSH funding 
typically shored up state Medicaid budgets 
more generally instead of being passed on to 
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hospitals. In fact, hospitals in several com-
munities reported a decline in DSH pay-
ments in recent years. Yet, both inpatient 
and outpatient safety net providers in some 
communities continued to receive funding 
to treat uninsured people through programs 
largely or partially funded through DSH 
mechanisms or Medicaid waivers, includ-
ing the Ingham Health Plan in Lansing, the 
Medical Services Initiative in Orange County 
and the charity care programs in New Jersey.
ARRA’s protection of the Medicaid 
program—requiring that states maintain 
Medicaid eligibility at July 2008 levels as a 
condition for receiving a higher rate of fed-
eral matching funds—indirectly helped both 
hospitals and health centers and prevented 
states from making more severe Medicaid 
cuts. Without these so-called “maintenance-
of-effort” requirements, providers likely 
would have lost revenue as patients lost 
coverage. Instead, Medicaid enrollment grew 
significantly since 2007, and some providers’ 
proportion of Medicaid patients—compared 
to uninsured patients—increased, improv-
ing their financial position. ARRA did not 
safeguard Medicaid provider reimbursement 
levels, and about half of the communities 
experienced provider payment rate reduc-
tions, but states still had to provide enhanced 
Medicaid payment rates to FQHCs. And, 
in some communities, including Cleveland 
and Lansing, new or increased hospital taxes 
that gained matching federal Medicaid dol-
lars and were then redistributed to hospitals 
helped alleviate these cuts. 
Budget deficits take toll 
How state and local budget deficits 
affected health care programs and fund-
ing for providers also varied. States, such 
as Washington and New Jersey, that had 
extended public insurance programs to 
cover additional groups—including new 
or undocumented immigrants, childless 
adults, and higher-income parents—typically 
pared back this coverage. In addition, some 
respondents believed that additional federal 
dollars for FQHCs supplanted some state 
and local funding for safety net providers. 
Indeed, most communities saw state fund-
ing sources for health centers decline—even 
completely eliminated in Phoenix and 
Orange County—and the few communities, 
for example, Seattle and Miami, where health 
centers receive direct local funding typically 
saw reductions.
Although local tax revenues, which sup-
port county hospitals in half of the com-
munities, declined, local officials typically 
allocated a greater proportion of available 
funds to these hospitals so that funding levels 
were at least stable. Maintaining these public 
expenditures can be financially advanta-
geous for the community as a whole because 
the funds often can secure federal Medicaid 
matching funds. By also pursuing internal 
cost-containment strategies, most safety net 
hospitals—public and private—weathered the 
recession, and the financial situation of some 
even improved from 2007. Miami’s public 
hospital, however, was in significant financial 
distress, reportedly because of management 
issues, declining local tax-revenue support 
and significant growth in uncompensated 
care costs in this community where almost a 
third of the population is uninsured. 
In an effort to serve more people in 
a cost-effective way, community safety 
nets redoubled efforts to advance the 
medical-home model that has attracted 
national attention as a goal for all patients. 
Respondents reported that community 
health centers embody this approach, given 
that many health centers serve as a one-stop 
shop for many additional social services and 
use health care teams to coordinate patients’ 
care and manage transitions to other provid-
ers. A Seattle FQHC director expressed a 
common sentiment, “We are the medical-
home model. It’s new for everybody else, but 
it’s what we’ve been doing forever.” 
Still, many safety net providers were 
unable to keep up with increased demand for 
certain services. Capacity for services that 
have long been the most difficult for low-
income people to access—specialty, dental 
and mental health care—typically remained 
flat or even declined in some communities. 
Several states cut or reduced coverage of 
optional Medicaid benefits—especially adult 
dental services, but also podiatry, vision and 
other care—and funding for state psychiatric 
institutions and community-based mental 
health services. 
Although the safety net remained largely 
intact and even expanded in some areas 
during the economic downturn, providers 
may face mounting challenges depending 
on how long the recession’s effects linger 
and how implementation of national health 
reform proceeds. Enhanced federal Medicaid 
matching funds to states are slated to phase 
out by mid-2011 and, although the National 
Conference of State Legislatures reports state 
revenues are improving, more than half of 
states were projecting budget deficits for 
fiscal year 2012. While the federal Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
required states to maintain Medicaid eligi-
bility levels, loss of federal Medicaid funds 
could cause states to cut other funds that 
support the safety net. 
Bracing for Health reform
Providers, while positive about the potential 
to treat newly insured patients, were anxious 
about the prospect of inadequate reimburse-
ments from Medicaid and from health plans 
offered through state insurance exchanges 
scheduled to come on line in 2014. They 
speculated that primary care physician sup-
ply, already tight in some markets, would 
likely be insufficient to handle additional 
demand from newly insured patients, espe-
cially if physicians are unwilling to treat 
patients because of low payment rates. 
Inadequate physician supply, in turn, could 
exacerbate existing pressures on ED capacity. 
Hospitals and physician groups also 
were exploring how to respond to expected 
Medicare payment reforms, including the 
introduction of ACOs and other forms of 
risk-based payment. Some hospitals and 
large physician groups were working to 
develop ACOs. But, in most markets, the 
early reaction to health reform was increased 
anxiety about whether payment rates for 
newly covered patients would be adequate 
and coming reductions in the growth of 
Medicare payments, heightening existing 
pressures to engage in hospital-physician 
alignment activities, health information tech-
nology adoption and cost-cutting measures. 
A key concern from safety net respon-
dents was the extent to which support will 
continue for low-income people who remain 
uninsured even after the coverage expan-
sions slated for 2014. Although ARRA grants 
are ending, FQHCs are starting to receive 
additional funds under the health reform 
law—$11 billion over five years to double the 
number of patients served by 2015. However, 
additional community health center funding 
has already been scaled back, with $600 mil-
lion cut this year during the recent budget 
compromise to keep the federal government 
from shutting down. Likewise, recent reports 
indicate some additional drops in state or 
local public funding for safety net provid-
ers, as well as drops in private foundation 
support and donations that non-FQHC 
clinics rely on. Also, providers feared that 
declining DSH funds starting in 2014 may 
exceed the relative increase in revenues that 
newly insured patients bring. Indeed, safety 
net hospitals in Boston—where state health 
reform in 2006 preceded national reform—
struggled financially after much of their 
direct funding was reallocated to subsidize 
insurance coverage. 
Safety net providers in communities 
with large Latino populations, including 
Orange County, northern New Jersey and 
Miami, were particularly concerned about 
future resources for the safety net. The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated 
undocumented immigrants will account for 
a third of the 23 million people expected to 
remain uninsured after full implementation 
of PPACA. With undocumented immigrants 
comprising a greater proportion of the unin-
sured than before, some respondents worried 
that public and private funding for services 
for the uninsured could evaporate.
Health plans, while looking forward to 
opportunities to expand enrollment sub-
stantially under national reform, nearly all 
voiced strong concern about the potential 
for adverse selection—attracting sicker-than-
average enrollees—in the insurance exchang-
es. The individual mandate’s penalties for 
lack of insurance were widely perceived as 
too weak, leading many plan respondents 
and market observers to expect that a sub-
stantial portion of healthy people will remain 
on the sidelines and out of the exchanges. 
Another concern for many plans—especially 
national for-profit plans—was complying 
with minimum medical-loss ratios (MLRs)—
the percentage of premium spent on patient 
care—and additional state and federal regu-
latory requirements. However, the degree of 
concern about additional regulation varied 
widely across markets, with not-for-profit 
local and regional plans in highly regulated 
states often already meeting or exceeding 
MLR and other regulatory requirements 
imposed by national reform.
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Every two-three years, HSC conducts 
site visits to 12 nationally representative 
communities as part of the Community 
Tracking Study to interview health 
care leaders about the local health care 
market and how it has changed. The 
communities are Boston; Cleveland; 
Greenville, S.C.; Indianapolis; Lansing, 
Mich.; Little Rock, Ark.; Miami; north-
ern New Jersey; Orange County, Calif.; 
Phoenix; Seattle; and Syracuse, N.Y. 
Almost 550 interviews were conducted 
in the 12 communities with representa-
tives of health plans, hospitals, physician 
organizations, major employers, benefit 
consultants, insurance brokers, com-
munity health centers, consumer advo-
cates and state and local policy makers 
between March and October 2010. This 
Issue Brief reflects the high-level key find-
ings from these interviews. In the coming 
months, HSC researchers will complete 
in-depth analyses on a range of topics 
that will be published as HSC Issue and 
Research Briefs and in peer-reviewed 
journal articles.
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